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Abstract 
This paper looks into the sovereign credit default swap (CDS) market from two 
perspectives. First, it analyses the relation between CDS and bond spreads. The results on 
a single-entity basis suggest that the CDS market leads the bond market in price discovery, 
especially during 2010, while both markets contribute during the pre-Lehman period and in 
2009. Moreover, the inclusion of the EURIBOR-EUREPO 3-month spread helps to restore 
the long-run relation after the Lehman bailout. An event-study, which compares the 
reaction of sovereign CDS and bond markets to policy announcements in Europe, suggests 
that both markets react in the same way, especially after the release of bad news. As for the 
relation between prices and volumes of sovereign CDSs, estimates do not point to any 
stable relation. The second perspective is the relation between CDS spreads for sovereign 
and corporate entities. Our estimates on an aggregate and sector-wide basis point to a 
leading property of the former sector, even in 2009, while the banking sector increases its 
leading power during 2010. 
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Credit risk indicators have received much attention during the nancial crisis that began
in the summer of 2007. The bail-out of Lehman Brothers (15 September 2008) has shown
the importance of nancial market liquidity and has demonstrated that risk management
is dangerous if inappropriately used. During the crisis OTC credit derivatives came under
attack because they were identied as the main contributors to the widespread turmoil,
creating a new kind of dimension, namely counterparty credit risk. Hence, the need to pro-
vide more information through the creation of trade reporting for regulatory authorities,
as suggested for example by Banque de France (2010) and IFSL (2009), as well as to un-
derstand what is the \best" credit risk indicator, especially during a crisis. During 2010,
the country risk crisis evidenced the need to identify whether sovereign CDS spreads are
linked to corporate sector CDS spreads and whether CDS market volumes could aect
sovereign CDS spreads. In the latter case, speculative behaviour could occur in order to
increase spreads, aecting market perception of country risk assessment. However, Due
(2010a, 2010b) and Citigroup (2010) suggest that CDS traders are not able to push cor-
porate and sovereign entities to default given the small size of the CDS market relative to
bond markets. Moreover, Carmassi and Micossi (2010) demonstrate that sovereign bond
spreads react to signicant bad news about the Eurozone.
The empirical literature on the econometric properties of credit risk indicators con-
centrates on detecting the leading market for credit risk. To do this, authors study the
dynamic relation between CDS and bond markets. For the sovereign sector, studies by
Aktung et al. (2009), Ammer and Cai (2007) and more recently by Coudert and Gex
(2010), among others, analyse the relation between CDS and bond spreads in the short
run, through the Granger casuality test, and in the long run, through cointegration analy-
sis and measures such as Gonzalo and Granger (1995) and Hasbrouck (1995) derived from
a vector error correction model (VECM). Results from all the papers indicate that the
CDS market seems to lead the bond market in terms of price discovery, even if the liquidity
of every market is essential for the leading property, especially before 2007. Moreover, the
rst paper shows that results change according to dierent information criteria, while the
second points to the cheapest-to-deliver option as an important determinant of the basis.
The third paper uses a panel analysis to demonstrate that in both emerging markets and
the riskiest countries (such as PIIGS) the CDS market is the leader, while for the safest
countries (for example France and the Netherlands) the bond market leads in terms of
price discovery.
1Corresponding author: alecarbo@msn.com. A rst version of this paper was prepared in September
2010 during my internship at the Economic Outlook and Monetary Policy Department, Financial Analysis
Division of the Bank of Italy. I would like to thank Antonio Di Cesare for invaluable comments and
suggestions, as well as for his patience throughout my stay. I would also like to thank Giuseppe Grande,
Aviram Levy, Nicoletta Olivanti, Marcello Pericoli, Christine Stone and the referee for numerous comments.
Particular thanks go to Andrea Carboni for numerous discussions on previous versions of this work. Last
but not least, I would like to thank all the members of the division, especially Wanda Cornacchia, as well
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7For the corporate sector, Blanco et al. (2004) and Zhu (2004), among others, use the
same econometric techniques for both the short- and long-run relations. They show that
the CDS market is the main forum for credit risk, even if Zhu notes that the leading
property of one market against the other could depend on geographical location and
dierent market liquidity. More recently, Baba and Inada (2007) conrm the dominant
role of the CDS market for Japanese mega-banks.
Another strand of the literature deals with the relation between CDS and asset swap
spreads. The analysis of Crouch and Marsh (2005) and De Wit (2006) on corporate and
sovereign entities is based on Granger casuality test and cointegration techniques to verify
the validity of the no-arbitrage relation and the price discovery. The rst paper shows
that the CDS market is the leader in terms of price discovery for the corporate sector,
while the second paper nds that most of the series analysed are cointegrated.
Other works try to go a step further by extending the analysis and introducing dierent
factors in the relation between two credit risk markets for both sovereign and corporate
entities. Chan-Lau and Kim (2004), Longsta et al. (2003) and Norden and Weber (2004),
among others, study the dynamic analysis among CDS spreads, bond spreads and equity
market returns. By using the same econometric techniques they highlight the importance
of CDS market information 
ows for price discovery of credit risk for the majority of the
entities. On the other hand, Forte and Pe~ na (2007) show that the stock market leads
credit risk markets expressed by CDS and bond spreads. Fontana (2009) shows that the
introduction of the TED spread in the VECM drives the basis dynamics when it is negative,
maintaining the leading role of the CDS market during nancial turmoil. Finally, Bystr om
(2005), Ehlers et al. (2010) and Fung et al. (2008) measure the extent to which iTraxx
and equity markets are related. In the short run one market contributes to the other with
a bivariate direction, as evidenced by the Granger casuality test. For the cointegration
analysis, Fung et al. (2008) use VECM to demonstrate that the credit market is the leader
in terms of price discovery.
To the best of our knowledge, the relation between the sovereign and the corporate
sector is only oered, on a sector-wide basis, in a technical document provided by Credit
Suisse (2010), in which they analyse the relation between an index of sovereign CDS
spreads (SovX Western Europe) and a corporate index (iTraxx Europe or the iTraxx
Senior Financials). Moreover, they go a step further and try to price sovereign default
risk into corporate credit spreads.
In this paper we focus our attention on two features of credit risk indicators. Firstly, we
study their dynamic properties using both short- and long-run analysis of sovereign CDS
and bond spreads. We also add a proxy for funding costs to try to restore the long-run
dynamic relation between CDS and bond spreads during nancial turmoil. Moreover, we
analyse how CDS and bond spreads react to particular negative news regarding country
risk and the interaction between spreads and market data. Secondly, we turn to the
relation between the sovereign and the corporate sector using CDS indices, on the one
hand, and CDS spreads for both the sovereign and the banking sector, on the other.
Our study adds to the existing literature in three ways. We extend the dynamic
8analysis to local CDS and bond markets during 2010. Moreover, we take into account the
funding issues and counterparty risk in the interbank market after the Lehman Brothers
bailout. Secondly, we perform the analysis of the sovereign and the corporate sector on
both an aggregate, through the use of CDS indices, and a sector-wide basis. Finally, we
try to detect the relation between spreads and volumes in the sovereign CDS market.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the credit risk indicators used
in our analysis and shows the no-arbitrage relationship. Section 3 deals with econometric
methodologies and treats data selection. Section 4 provides the results, while Section 5
concludes. Figures and tables are contained in an Appendix.
2 Credit Default Swap and Bond Spreads: Denition and
No-Arbitrage Relation
2.1 Denition
Credit default swaps (CDS) are the most common type of credit derivatives. A CDS is a
bilateral contract that provides protection on the par value of a specied reference asset,
with the protection buyer paying a periodic fee (spread) or a one-o premium (set as a
percentage amount of the protection bought) to a protection seller, while the protection
seller makes the payment when a credit event occurs during the life of the contract.2 Ac-
cording to ISDA (2003) and Credit Suisse (2007 and 2010), credit events for governmental
authorities can be classied as: 1) failure to pay, 2) repudiation / moratorium and/or 3)
restructuring. Hence, a CDS can be viewed as an insurance contract against a risky event
on a reference entity. In this case, the settlement payment is made by the seller according
to the contract settlement option.
Credit derivatives specify physical or cash settlement.3 In the physical settlement, when
a credit event occurs, the buyer delivers the reference asset to the seller, in return for
which the seller pays the face value of the delivered asset to the buyer (Choudhry 2006).
The contract may specify a number of alternative assets (called deliverable obligations)
that the buyer can deliver.4 When more than one deliverable obligation is specied, the
buyer will invariably deliver the cheapest asset on the list of eligible assets: this provides
the concept of cheapest-to-deliver option, which is an embedded option aorded by the
protection buyer.5
On the other hand, in the cash settlement option the contract species a predetermined
payout value when a credit event occurs. Generally, the protection seller pays the buyer
2There are two pricing types in the CDS market. The rst is the running spread, while the second is
the up-front basis. See O'Kane and Sen (2003) for the dierences between the two.
3There is a third type of settlement, called digital, where the seller pays a xed percentage (decided
at the issue of the contract) on the notional.
4See ISDA (2003) and Credit Suisse (2010) for specic contractual issues.
5See Bomn (2005), Choudhry (2006), Due and Singleton (2003) and Jankowitsch et al. (2007) for
a more specic reference.
9the dierence between the nominal amount of the default swap and the nal (market)
value of the reference asset, determined by means of a poll of dealer banks. This last value
can be viewed as the recovery value of the asset.6
The CDS spread is the spread that determines the cash 
ow paid by the buyer of the
contract. In this sense, the spread is the compensation for taking the risk of incurring the
loss given default when a credit event occurs. The contract species two legs: the premium
leg, which contains the periodic payments until maturity or until the credit event occurs,
and the protection leg, which contains the payment made by the protection seller in the
case of a credit event.
In mathematical terms, the spread is the sum that makes the expected present value of the






e rt(100   Mt)q(t)dt; (1)
where r is the constant risk free rate, Q(t) is the risk neutral survival probability at time
t, with Q(ti) = 1  
R ti
0 q(t)dt, Mt is the market value and  is the CDS premium.8 The
left-hand side corresponds to the premium leg, while the right-hand side is the protection
leg.
2.2 No-Arbitrage Relation
An investor can buy credit risk by selling a CDS or by buying a risky bond, otherwise he
can sell credit risk by buying a CDS protection or by selling a bond. By buying a CDS on
a certain sovereign entity and a bond issued by the same entity, one can replicate a riskless
bond. Therefore, the credit spread (defaultable minus the riskless bond) must equal the
credit default swap spread. This simple no-arbitrage relationship is the baseline building
block for every study of the lead-lag denitions between the two markets.
Following Zhu (2004), we can state formally the no-arbitrage relationship between the
CDS spread and the bond spread. The current price of the defaultable par xed coupon
bond is:
P = 100 =
N X
i=1




where q(t) is the risk neutral default probability. The price of a par xed coupon bond
can be decomposed in three terms. The rst is the value of discounted coupons in the
6Intuitively, for a notional value of 1 the seller pays the loss given default LGD = (1 RR), where RR
is the recovery rate of the reference asset.
7This pricing relation is dierent in the case of up-front pricing. See O'Kane and Sen (2003) for details.
8This kind of specication uses the risk neutral valuation principle under complete markets hypothesis
and the absence of arbitrage opportunities. These conditions allow us to use the class of equivalent
martingale measures for both survival and default probabilities.
10event that there is no default, the second is the value of the principal at maturity, while
the third relates to the market value of the bond if it defaults.
Assume that an investor shorts the defaultable bond and purchases a par xed rate risk
free note: since the risk-free rate is constant, the risk-free note can always be sold at
par whenever the risky bond defaults. Given that the initial net investment is zero, the














e rt100q(t)dt + e rtN100Q(tN) )
N X
i=1





Comparing this with the CDS pricing equation it is straightforward to obtain that  =
(c   r), with the no-arbitrage relation between the two markets. According to Choudhry
(2006) this dierence is called cash-CDS basis.
In this case, if c is the yield-to-maturity (YTM) on the bond and r the YTM on risk-free
bond, we have:
c    = r (4)
Obviously, if c  is signicantly greater than r, it is protable to buy the T-year par yield
bond issued by the reference entity, buy the default swap and short the T-year Treasury
par yield. This is the negative basis strategy suggested by Choudhry (2006): an investor
aims to earn a risk free return by buying and selling identical credit risk across dierent
markets. On the other hand, if c    is signicantly less than r, it is protable to short
the T-year par yield bond, sell the credit default swap and buy the T-year Treasury par
yield.
As suggested by Choudhry (2006), De Wit (2006) and O'Kane and McAdie (2001), this
relation does not hold in practice, for particular times and market conditions, owing to
several factors. Positive basis could be determined, among other things, by the presence
of an appreciable delivery option, as well as by the diculties in shorting cash bonds.
Negative basis, instead, could depend also on counterparty default risk and funding issues.
In particular, funding and liquidity issues may aect the validity of the no-arbitrage
relation, especially during a nancial crisis, when the basis could become negative. Nor-
mally, one could buy a par risky bond funded at EURIBOR, buy a credit default swap on
the same reference entity, and enter into an interest rate swap (IRS) to swap xed coupons
from the par bond against a stream of 
oating rates (EURIBOR) plus a spread, the asset
swap spread.
To take care of funding issues during the nancial crisis, one can buy a par risky bond,
funded at a REPO rate, using the purchased bond as collateral, buy a credit default swap
11and enter into an IRS to swap xed coupons from bond against a stream of 
oating rates
(EURIBOR) plus the asset swap spread.9
Finally, when the CDS and bond are traded in two dierent currencies, the basis is
also aected by the correlation between the exchange rates and the spreads, by their
volatilities, and by FX depreciation on default.10
3 Methodology and Data
3.1 Econometric Analysis
Since one of the main purposes of the paper is to examine the econometric properties
of credit risk indicators (in our case credit default swap and bond spreads), modern time
series techniques, like cointegration tests, Granger causality test and vector error correction
models, are appropriate.
To test whether the no-arbitrage theoretical relations hold empirically, it is possible to use
the cointegration test proposed by Engle and Granger (1987): two series are cointegrated
if there are one or more common trends that allow them to move in the same fashion in the
long-run. In simple terms, two series are cointegrated if their linear combination originates
a stationary series. Let us assume, for example, that Xt and Yt are the two (integrated)
series of interest. If the two series are cointegrated, with cointegrating coecient , then
the dierence Yt   Xt is stationary, otherwise it has a unit root.
The Engle and Granger test follows two steps: testing for stationarity and estimation
of the order of cointegration of the variables. For the rst step, the most common two
tests are the Dickey-Fuller unit root test and the Phillips and Perron test.11 Moreover,
given that the econometric literature has suggested that stationarity tests may have a
lower power, it is possible to perform the two together with the DF-GLS test of Elliott et
al. (1996). As suggested by Engle and Granger (1987), when the cointegrating coecient
 is unknown, it could be estimated using for example an OLS estimation. Therefore, we
have:
Yt =  + Xt + zt; (5)
and then perform the Engle-Granger-ADF on residuals ^ zt of this regression, with an in-
tercept but without time trend. There are two dierent useful methodologies that allow
us to estimate cointegrating vectors. The rst is the Johansen Maximum Likelihood anal-
ysis of cointegration (Johansen 1988, and 1991), while the second is the Dynamic OLS
(DOLS) proposed by Stock and Watson (1993). The Johansen methodology helps us in
two dierent ways: it provides the number of cointegrating vectors through the lambda-
trace and lambda-max test, and it allows us to estimate the value of the cointegrating
9During a nancial crisis the possibility of oering the purchased bond as collateral could reduce the
cost of funding at EUREPO, which is the funding rate available against a high quality collateral.
10See J.P. Morgan (2010) for further details.
11See Hamilton (1994) for a comprehensive treatment of cointegration and unit root analysis.
12coecients. On the other hand, Stock and Watson show that the estimator of  in (5)
is consistent, but with a non-normal distribution. To overcome this problem, they have
developed a modied version of (5), where Yt is also explained by past and future values
in the variation of Xt:
Yt = 0 + Xt +
p X
j= p
jXt j + ut: (6)
The DOLS estimator of  is the OLS estimator of  in (6). On the opposite side, when
the cointegrating coecient is known, the stationarity hypothesis could be tested on zt =
Yt   Xt with Dickey-Fuller, Phillips-Perron, as well as with the DF-GLS test.
All empirical literature on the lead-lag relationships among credit risk indicators (Blanco
et al. 2004 and Zhu 2004, among others) have veried that two prices should be equal in
the long run, with a cointegrating vector of [1, -1, c]: for example, if CDS spreads and
bond spreads are I(1) and the basis is I(0), there are no-arbitrage opportunities in the long
run, as predicted by the theory, with a zero constant in the cointegrating space. The same
could be applied to the CDS-bond basis. If the two prices do not cointegrate with the [1,
-1, c] restriction, it is possible that either the two markets price credit risk dierently, that
the prices of one credit risk market re
ect something other than credit risk (i.e. liquidity
risk), or that one market price contains measurement errors. Blanco et al. (2004), De Wit
(2006) and O'Kane and McAdie (2001) suggest that the failure of the cointegrating test
depends on the presence of the cheapest-to-deliver option embedded in the CDS spreads.
To deal with this problem we build the Johansen methodology for both credit risk indi-
cators with and without a constant in the cointegraing space, testing for the presence of
[1, -1, c] and [1, -1] cointegrating vectors. Moreover, when the evidence of cointegration is
conrmed, we estimate the cointegrating coecient by DOLS, ignoring the constant, and
we test for the [1, -1] cointegrating vector. In addition, we estimate a cointegrating vector
by adding the spread between three-month EURIBOR and EUREPO, similar to Fontana
(2009), and by considering that Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001), Cossin and Hricko (2001)
as well as others, and more recently Di Cesare and Guazzarotti (2010) and Tang and Yan
(2007) treat liquidity as an important component for credit risk. In addition, Coudert and
Gex (2010) emphasize the eect of liquidity in both bond and derivative markets. From
our point of view, the rationale is simple. If the basis is negative, as evidenced by Figure
(1), it is protable to buy the bond and the CDS on the same entity. Given the fact
that during periods of nancial distress, the interbank market dries up and an increase in
counterparty risk arises, we have decided to include this spread in the cointegrating vector
to help restore the long-run relationship between derivative and bond markets. With this
extension we are able to deal with the funding issues related to the crisis period.12
The study of the dynamic relationships between two variables can be conducted with
two dierent approaches, which allow us to focus on both short- and long-run properties.
For the rst case, the Granger causality test is a suitable measure. By using a Vector
12During nancial crises, posting a collateral could reduce funding costs to EUREPO level.
13Autoregression (VAR) methodology it is possible to detect whether past values of a credit
risk indicator (for example CDS spreads) can predict future values of the other indicator
(for example bond spreads). The number of lags in the VAR can be selected according to
the most commonly used information criteria, such as Akaike Information Criteria (AIC)
or Schwartz Information Criteria (SIC). After VAR estimation, the Granger causality test
can be performed by an F-test with null hypothesis that all coecients of past values are
zero against by hypothesis that at least one is dierent from zero. More specically, if we
want to verify the relationship from Xt to Yt, we can write:







iXt i + t (7)
and perform the F-test with H0: 
1=
2=:::=
p=0, and H1= 
i 6= 0, with at least one 
i
dierent from zero. We can say that this test could be considered a rst approximation of
the relationships between dierent credit risk indicators. However, the empirical literature
shows that the Granger causality test does not give a direct answer regarding the causality
relations, as suggested for example by Zhu (2004).
In the second case, when two or more variables are cointegrated, one can use the vector
error correction model (VECM) to investigate further the dynamic relationships between
credit risk indicators, as well as to compute the contributions of price discovery. The
VECM becomes:















with pCDS the CDS spread, pBS the bond spread and "it i.i.d. residuals. The lagged basis
spread is the error correction term and it is used as an added explanatory variable.
The meaning of the coecients of the error correction term (1 and 2) is straightforward:
they measure the degree to which prices in a particular market adjust to correct price
discrepancies from their long-term trend. For example, if 1 is negative and signicantly
dierent from zero, the bond market is contributing to the discovery of credit risk and
the CDS market adjusts to remove pricing errors, while if 2 is positive and signicantly
dierent from zero, the CDS market contributes to the discovery of credit risk and the
bond market adjusts to remove pricing errors. If both coecients are signicant, then
both markets contribute to price discovery. In our analysis, when the traditional basis
is I(0), we assume that 0 = 0 and 1 = 1, while we relax these restrictions on the
error correction term by using the cointegrating vectors according to both the DOLS and
Johansen's methodology.
14Moreover, when the cointegrating vector is augmented with the liquidity proxy, the new
system of equations for the VECM becomes:


































with Sprt the three-month EURIBOR-EUREPO spread.
Once the VECM is constructed, we can compute the measures to understand price
discovery. As suggested by Ballie et al. (2002) and Lehman (2002), when the same asset
(i.e. credit risk in our case) is traded in dierent markets, its price is discovered by news
presented in one or more of these markets. Together with Blanco et al. (2004), they argue
that the appropriate method to investigate price discovery is not clear, but there are two
popular common factor models that can be used: the rst one is the method developed by
Hasbrouck (1995), while the second is that of Gonzalo and Granger (1995). Both models
are related on VECM specications, but they dier regarding at least two points. For the
rst, Hasboruck decomposes the implicit price variance, with the assumption that price
volatility re
ects the 
ows of information. For the other, Gonzalo and Granger ignore
the correlation among markets and consider that the market that adjusts least to price
movements in the other markets is the leading one. Concerning the second point, the two
indicators oer similar results when the markets are aected by the same information 
ows.
When residuals are correlated, Hasbrouck's model can produce an ecient estimate of the
contribution to price discovery only when the average of its bounds is considered, while
the Gonzalo and Granger measure is ecient. However, Baillie et al. (2002) conclude that
one measure does not provide a better price discovery with respect to the other because
this depends on its denition, according either to the error correction phenomenon or to
the correlations among markets innovations. They suggest using the Hasbrouck measure
because it has a more general economic appeal and interpretation. Blanco et al. (2004)
report both measures, while Zhu (2004) computes only the Gonzalo Granger measure
because of residual autocorrelation.
According to the Gonzalo and Granger (1995) study, we calculate the contribution of
each market to price discovery by measuring the ratio of the speed of adjustment in the






with a lower bound of zero and an upper bound of 1: when the value is negative, the
indicator is zero, while if the value is above 1, GG is worth 1. If this measure tends to 1,
the CDS market leads in price discovery and the bond market moves afterwards to correct
for pricing errors; if this measure tends to 0, the bond market leads the derivative market,
while if the measure is close to 0.5 both markets contribute to price discovery and we can
say nothing about the leading market. Even in this case, the analysis can be extended to
the CDS-bond basis or to other variables.
On the other hand, Hasboruck's measure is constructed using the variance-covariance



























where volatilities relate to the variance-covariance matrix between "1t and "2t. The
Hasbrouck measure is rarely used in the literature because of the dependence of the bounds
on the residual correlation. In the case of the augmented VECM system, we calculate the
two price discovery measures in the same way as the initial VECM. We have decided to
repeat the same analysis on dierent CDS indices and on CDS spreads for the banking
sector. Our purpose is to investigate the extent to which CDS spreads for sovereign enti-
ties, expressed as an index or a single-basis, are aected or aects movements in corporate
CDS spreads.13
To measure the extent to which i) sovereign credit risk markets are aected by news
and announcements and ii) credit risk indicators are related to market dynamics, we
conduct two dierent types of analysis. For the rst we investigate the reaction of the
CDS market after the release of information regarding Greek default risk and Eurozone
nancial stability. To do this we construct a dummy variable with an event window of
(t   2  t  t + 2), where t is the day of the announcement. Then we use several equa-
tions, including lagged levels of CDS spreads either with the dummy variable or with
both the dummy variable and an interaction term obtained by multiplying the dummy for
lagged values of CDS, and estimate the weights by OLS. An alternative way to analyse
the same problem is to construct an event study following the same lines as Panetta et al.
(2009). We conduct this exercise and estimate the dierences in the reaction from both
CDS and bond markets.
The second type of analysis is related to market dynamics. Recently, Due (2010a and
2010b) and others have argued that speculation in CDS markets does not drive up bor-
rowing costs for Eurozone countries. For every country, we try to assess the relationship
between CDS and bond spreads, together with three credit risk market proxies, namely,
13I would like to thank Aviram Levy and Antonio Di Cesare for suggesting this point.
16gross and net positions and the number of contracts. We compute dierent regressions:
the level, the rst dierence and the growth rate of CDS and bond spreads are regressed
on both their lagged values together with the lagged values of the growth rates of these
proxies; moreover, we try to put ourselves on the opposite side by estimating whether
CDS premia are useful determinants of these market proxies.
3.2 Data Selection
We perform the empirical analysis on a sample of 18 European sovereign entities.14 Our
period spanned from 3 January 2005 to 29 July 2010, splitting in three subperiods: pre-
Lehman Brothers bailout (3 January 2005 - 12 September 2008), post-Lehman Brothers
(15 September 2008 - 31 December 2009) and (1 January 2010 - 29 July 2010) to deal
with country risk turmoil.
European sovereign entities data are selected in two dierent ways.15 Bond spread
measures are obtained from the aggregate ten-year Treasury index from Bloomberg for
every country by removing the same index for Germany. Hence, the bond spread measure
is a dierence over the 10-year German Bund index. However, for three countries (Sweden,
Hungary and Latvia) the ten-year benchmark bond is taken from Datastream.
Given that the market does not evaluate Germany as a pure risk-free country, every coun-
try's CDS measure was corrected by removing the same measure for Germany. To match
CDS with bond spreads, we have chosen ve-year CDS spreads measure as a compro-
mise between maturity and liquidity homogeneity for bonds.16 Data for CDS spreads are
obtained from Datastream. We use daily data for the analysis of price discovery.
To deal with sovereign credit risk market dynamics we use both gross and net positions
on CDSs, as well as the number of contracts for our selected countries from DTCC.
However, data are available only from November 2008 and with weekly frequency. We
perform our regression analysis from 7 November 2008 to 23 July 2010.17 Therefore,
we construct our sample by selecting weekly (Friday) values of credit risk and market
indicators for the available time period, adjusting for missing days.18 The dummy variable
for announcements derives from the timeline of signicant bad news in Carmassi and
Micossi (2010), which spans from 4 December 2009 to 21 June 2010. Daily data are used
for this analysis.
For CDS indices we have used the iTraxx Europe (ITRXEBE), the iTraxx Senior Fi-
nancials (ITRXESE) and the iTraxx Crossover (ITRXEXE) gathered from Bloomberg for
corporate rms, and the SovX Western Europe index for sovereign entities. Unfortunately,
14The 18 sovereigns are Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece,
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain and Sweden.
15There could be dierent currencies involved in the construction of the basis. However, Quanto CDS
could reduce the impact of this issue.
16I am grateful to Antonio Di Cesare for this caveat. We have decided to concentrate on the most liquid
segments for both bond and credit derivative markets.
17I would like to thank Maria Pia Mingarini for providing DTCC data.
18Volumes data are not available for 25 December 2009 and 1 January 2010.
17this index was only available from September 2009. The time series before September 2009
was constructed using a simple average of the CDS premia for the constituent countries.
Data for these spreads are gathered from Datastream.19
For banks' CDS spreads we have proceeded with a ltering process. Firstly, we have
gathered the name of banks for every country from the list of local banks provided by
Datastream. Secondly, we have ordered the banks in the list according to the market
value. We have chosen those banks representing 80 per cent of market value of total market
value of the list. Therefore, we have gathered ve-year CDS spreads for every selected
bank and we have computed the average of spreads. After this process, we remain with
eleven sovereign entities for which bank spreads are available.20
4 Results
For ease of exposition we have decided to divide empirical results in two parts. In the rst
we present results from the analysis of sovereign CDS and bond spreads, dividing between
dynamic relations and market reactions. In the second we describe the relation between
sovereign CDS spreads and corporate CDS spreads on a sector-wide basis.
4.1 Sovereign CDS vs Bond Spreads: Descriptive Statistics and Coin-
tegration Analysis
Results for descriptive statistics suggest that the average value of our bond spread and
the average value of ve-year CDS spread measures are divided by few basis points.21
However, data show heterogeneous composition, re
ecting both dierent perceptions of
country credit risk, as well as dierent developments in derivative and bond markets.
While the average basis turns out to be negative for all the three periods considered,
there are cases, like Bulgaria, Latvia and Sweden, where the values are all positive over
time. This could indicate the presence of dierent liquidity levels for both credit risk
markets, which can be relevant especially during periods of distress, or dierent market
developments with respect to the benchmark market.22
Unit root analysis was performed by running the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF)
and Phillips-Perron test for the all series considered. We found that most of the series
for bond spread measures considered are I(1), while the CDS spread of one country over
the same spread for German CDS is I(1) for 61 per cent of the countries considered.
19We have used all the countries on the Markit list, except Luxembourg. From 28 September 2009 to
19 March 2010 we have used the S2 series; from 22 to 30 March the average between S2 and S3 series,
while from 31 March to 29 July we have used the S3 series.
20The eleven sovereign entities are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Nether-
lands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden. The list of banks for every country is available from the author upon
request.
21For brevity we have decided not to show descriptive statistics and cointegration results. Tables are
available from the author upon request.
22See Boone et al. (2010).
18However, after Lehman Brothers bailout only one country out of eighteen has stationary
CDS spreads. When we focus on the traditional basis, we nd that for two thirds of all
countries, stationarity holds during the pre-Lehman period, but drops signicantly for the
other two subperiods. This can suggest that the no-arbitrage relation may no longer be
valid during periods of nancial distress.
We check for this by investigating the presence of cointegration through the trace
test. We provide the analysis for both the classical and the augmented cointegrating
vector, performing the test both with and without constant restricted to the cointegrating
vector. Akaike information criterion was chosen to determine the lag length of the VAR.
When there is cointegration between the series, in Tables (1) and (2), we have indicated for
every country the estimated cointegrating vector from the Johansen methodology without
constant, with constant and from the DOLS methodology. We have also indicated the
restrictions on the estimated cointegrating vectors.
Our ndings suggest that during the pre-Lehman period, CDS and bond spreads seem to
price credit risk equally in the long run only for eight out of eighteen countries. When
we impose restrictions on the estimated cointegrating vectors, we show that there are
only two cases where the traditional basis [1,-1] is respected and the same is true for [1,-
1,c]. This could suggest that both credit risk measures are not equal in the long run, as
theoretically indicated, but the linear combinations could be dierent, also bearing in mind
the signicance level of the constant in the cointegrating vector. Following the same lines
as Fontana (2009), we control for the presence of cointegration between CDS and bond
spreads by allowing the cointegrating vector to deal with funding cost issues. Surprisingly,
for the pre-Lehman period, twelve out of eighteen sovereign entities have both credit risk
indicators with a common trend. From the estimated cointegrating vector we can see that
the spread coecient is usually statistically dierent from zero, while the number of cases
where the constant is dierent from zero decreases.
For the post-Lehman period we nd that the number of cointegrating relations de-
creases to six countries, while when we allow for the presence of the spread, credit risk has
the same price for derivative and bond markets in twelve countries. This nding suggests
that the introduction of the spread EURIBOR-EUREPO allows us to restore cointegration,
especially for those countries with negative basis during the nancial turmoil. Even for
this subperiod, restrictions are rejected, suggesting a dierent linear combination between
credit risk indicators. Moreover, the signicance level of the constant in the cointegrating
vector is often high: this result could be interpreted in light of the analysis of Blanco et
al. (2004), who suggest that CDS and bond spreads could theoretically re
ect elements
other than credit risk, especially during periods of distress.
Finally, turning to the 2010 period, where country risk arises, we can see that cointe-
gration among derivative and bond markets holds for ve countries, for both traditional
and augmented cointegrating vectors.
194.2 Sovereign CDS vs Bond Spreads: Short- and Long-Term Dynamic
Interactions
As in Chan-Lau and Kim (2005) and Coudert and Gex (2010), among others, for sovereign
entities, results from the Granger causality test in Table (3) do not give a direct answer for
the short-term relationships between credit risk indicators. As a matter of fact, there is a
two-way causality relationship for most of the entities considered, indicating the presence
of a close connection between dierent markets, especially after the Lehman bailout, but
a no clear sign of the direction.23
However, it could be interesting to investigate the lead-lag properties in the short run.24
To deal with this issue, we show the details of the VAR analysis, indicating the lag, the
sign and the signicance level for both the CDS and bond spreads. Lagged values of bond
and CDS spreads seem generally signicant at one, four, ve, nine and ten days, with
dierent signs. However, it is dicult to try to extract a cyclical behaviour from these
market data. On the other hand, when we focus on the post-Lehman period, the data
suggest that lags from one to three days are usually signicant. Finally, results show that
both CDS and bond spreads with one, two and in some cases, seven days of delays are
useful determinants.
Further investigations for understanding the dynamic properties of dierent credit risk
indicators can be implemented by the use of the VECM (Eqs. 8 and 9), from which it is
possible to compute the two price discovery measures. Results for the pre-Lehman period
suggest that lambda coecients are with the correct suspected sign in half of the cases
considered. When we turn to the price discovery measures, both Gonzalo and Granger
(1995) and Hasbrouck (1995) values suggest that the bond market leads the CDS market
in terms of price discovery. However, France is the only entity for which the weight of one
market against the other changes according to dierent cointegrating vector estimations.
The importance of the bond market before the Lehman bailout is conrmed by the same
analysis conducted with the augmented cointegrating vector, even if one has to take into
account the small number of signicant lambdas.
The post-Lehman period seems to shift the magnitude and the signicance of the
lambas, while there is an increase in the volatility of credit risk indicators, re
ecting erratic
residuals from the VECM. On the one hand, we nd that the Gonzalo and Granger (1995)
measure suggests a doubtful interpretation of which market leads the other. However,
estimations conducted with DOLS indicate the derivative market as the main forum for
credit risk. The Hasbrouck measure seems to conrm the leading properties of the CDS
market.
On the other hand, when we perform the analysis with the augmented cointegrating vector,
both the Gonzalo and Granger (1995) and the Hasbrouck (1995) measures attribute to the
bond market the role of leading venue for credit risk information. From an econometric
23We select lag length by using Akaike information criterion.
24Once again, I am grateful to Antonio Di Cesare and Aviram Levy who suggested this exercise. For
brevity, we have decided not to show these tables, which are available from the author upon request.
20point of view, these dierent results could re
ect the high values of volatility during the
second subperiod.25
Finally, during 2010 the credit risk information content within the CDS market is
greater than that within the bond market. Both price discovery measures are in line with
this nding, even if there are opposite results when the cointegrating vector is constructed
by the Johansen methodology without a constant.
Our results are in line with Aktung et al. (2009) and Kavussanos and Palamidi (2008),
who nd an increasing role for the CDS market. However, Coudert and Gex (2010)
interpret their results splitting their sample according to the risk category. High spread
countries, such as PIIGS should have a leading role for the CDS market, while low spread
countries should re
ect a leading role for the bond market. Our results are in line only
for those countries with high CDS spreads, while for the others the interpretation is
cumbersome.26
4.3 Market Reactions: Implicit Behaviour Within the CDS and Bond
Markets
After the analysis of price discovery we consider credit risk market behaviour. On the
one hand we check whether the CDS and bond markets react to news about the Eurozone
crisis, according to the contribution of Carmassi and Micossi (2010). On the other, we
analyse the impact of the market structure proxy, such as CDS gross and net volumes,
together with the number of contracts on CDS and bond spreads.
For the reaction to especially bad news we use two methodologies. First, we estimate
AR(1), AR(2) and AR(5), plus a dummy variable as dened in Section (3.1), for either
the dierence between sovereign CDS spreads and German CDS spread, or the sovereign
CDS spread alone. Second, we conduct an event-study analysis in order to examine the
impact of bad news on cumulative changes in both CDS and bond spreads, with a ten-day
window. For ease of exposition, we will show only the second one in the Appendix. Results
suggest that the dummy variable has an impact from 3 to 14 basis points, for six countries
out of eighteen when we use net CDS spreads, while the impact goes from 3 to 18 basis
points, for ve out of eighteen when we use gross CDS spread.27 However, with gross CDS
spreads, the dummy variable becomes signicant only when combined with an interaction
term. Moreover, Italy and Spain are the only countries for which the dummy is always
signicant, irrespective of the lag length of the process describing the CDS spreads.
For the event-study analysis, even if the news is reabsorbed ve days after release, Figures
(4) and (5) seem to suggest that the reaction in the derivative market is smoother than
in the bond market. However, Table (10) indicates that the reaction is only signicant in
25The average value of standard deviations more than doubled from the pre- to the post-Lehman period.
26Nonetheless, the Hansen parameter stability test implies caution because of the presence of instability
among lambdas. Results are available upon request from the author.
27The impact of this dummy variable is 6 basis points only for the SovX index, exclusively in the case
of one and two lags for the model. Results are available from the author upon request.
21the case of one and two days after the event for Greece and Ireland. Moreover, Table (11)
shows that both derivative and bond markets react in the same way.
For the impact of proxies of market structure on the CDS and bond spreads, we
estimate a battery of regressions, where the dependent variable is either the level, the rst
dierences or the growth rate of credit risk indicators (CDS or bond spreads), while the
regressors are lagged values of both the dependent and either net or gross positions, or the
number of contracts in the CDS markets, expressed in terms of growth rates. Moreover,
we use one to four lags to capture the interrelations within one month.
Results (not shown) are dicult to interpret from an economic point of view. For the
relation between CDS spreads and net positions, the four- and the two-week growth rate
is signicantly dierent from zero, with a negative sign, especially for countries like PIIGS.
Moreover, countries like Poland and Sweden show that the rst lag of the change in net
positions is signicantly dierent from zero. On the bond side, the same considerations
could be extended to Ireland, while for the other cases it is dicult to nd a regularity.
When we focus on the relation between CDS spreads and the growth rate of gross positions
we nd two results: for Ireland, Portugal and Spain, this market proxy becomes signicant,
especially from the second to the fourth lagged value, while the signicant impact holds
for one week for Sweden. Moreover, the number of countries for which the lagged values
of gross positions become signicantly dierent from zero increases to fourteen. Turning
to the bond side, it is not easy to guess a particular regularity: results seem to conrm
that the rst two lags could be signicant determinants of bond spreads.
Finally, when the growth rate of the number of CDS contracts is considered, we can
say that for most of the entities (fteen out of eighteen), the rst two lagged values are
signicantly dierent from zero and with a positive sign. One or two lagged values of the
growth rate of the number of contracts are signicant CDS spread determinants. On the
bond side, the number of contracts are signicantly dierent from zero especially for one
and two lags.
Table (12) shows that for nine countries out of eighteen, either the level or the rst
dierence of the CDS spread helps to predict future values of growth rates in market
proxies. Our results seem in line with the studies of Due (2010a and 2010b), who nd
that there is no empirical relationship between CDS spreads and market volumes. Our
statistical analysis may suer from the problem of simultaneous relation among spreads
and volumes, so we are sceptical about a clear conclusion.
4.4 Sovereign CDS vs Corporate CDS: Descriptive Statistics and Coin-
tegration Analysis
Data for CDS indices evidence that the iTraxx Europe has lower average premia than the
iTraxx Senior Financials for both the pre- and the post-Lehman period. However, during
the 2010 sample period, the iTraxx Senior Financials become riskier, on average. When
we turn to the relation between sovereign CDS spreads and banks' CDS spreads, the story
is the same. There is an increase in the spreads of both categories during the three periods
22considered, with the average CDS spreads of the banking sector always greater than the
sovereign ones. Moreover, the dierence between the two average spreads becomes wider
during the post-Lehman period, suggesting an increase in the risk of banks.
Results from cointegration analysis for CDS indices show that cointegration is con-
rmed during the pre-Lehman period, while for both the post-Lehman and 2010 periods
the long-term relationship between the variables weakens. However, when we perform
the analysis for the augmented cointegrating vector, cointegration comes back during the
post-Lehman period and 2010, but only for iTraxx Europe. Lastly, cointegration analysis
for the relation between sovereign CDS and banks' CDS spreads conrms what we have
found before.28 Once again, the inclusion of the spread three-month EURIBOR versus
EUREPO seems to help restore the relationship between the two credit spreads during
the post-Lehman period. However, during the 2010 period cointegration holds in only one
case and in two cases with a traditional or augmented cointegrating vector. Estimates of
the cointegrating vector suggest that the coecient for banks' CDS spreads is negative
and signicant, while the constant is usually negative and signicant.
4.5 Sovereign CDS vs Corporate CDS: Short- and Long-Term Dynamic
Interactions
When we repeat the short-term exercise with the Granger causality test for CDS indices,
we nd in Table (15) that every iTraxx index is a useful determinant for the SovX index
during all periods.29 The CDS index on sovereign entities helps to predict the future
values of the iTraxx crossover after the Lehman bailout, while it increases its predicting
power during 2010. Generally, one day of delay in the data is shown to be signicant for
every regression in the VAR.
To complete the lead-lag analysis for the short run we have decided to calculate cross-
correlations between both the SovX index and every single iTraxx index, using ten days
for leads and lags.30 Our ndings (not shown) suggest that: i) all sovereign and corporate
indices are highly positively correlated, ii) all series are coincident as a result of the signif-
icance level in every one-day lagged variable, iii) the only exception is the leading power
of the SovX index (highest value of correlation at ten days) with respect to the iTraxx
Senior Financials, going against our previous ndings from the VAR analysis. However,
this point deserves caution in the light of the recent debate on the exposure of European
banks to PIIGS' debt.31 Moreover, Table (16) shows the Granger causality test conducted
on the relation between sovereign CDS spreads and banks' CDS spreads. Our results
suggest that the passage from the post-Lehman to the 2010 period seems to conrm the
28Results are available from the author upon request.
29In this case we do not consider dierent weights in the index, as suggested by Credit Suisse (2010).
30We have used a well-known methodology in the literature on stylized facts for business cycle. See
Stock, J.H. and M.W. Watson, (1999) for more on the methodology. However, we have decided not to use
cyclical component.
31See Money Supply blog on Ft.com, 13 August 2010.
23power of sovereign CDS spreads in predicting future changes in banks' CDS spreads. This
result could emphasize the leading role of the sovereign CDS market, especially during
country crisis periods. However, results from the Granger causality test show a two-way
relationship during 2010, when even banks' CDS spreads are useful determinants of future
changes in sovereign CDS spreads. This could depend on both a higher correlation due to
contagion and greater positions of banks on sovereign CDS contracts.
Tables (17) and (18) show the results from the VECM analysis on cointegrated series.
When we use the simple bivariate cointegrating vector, we nd that the Gonzalo-Granger
(1995) and the Hasbrouck (1995) measures are dicult to interpret. However, when we
include the spread, price discovery measures seem to go in the same direction.32 Results
from Table (18) suggest that the iTraxx market, for both European corporate and nan-
cials, beats the SovX market in terms of price discovery. However, after the Lehman
Brothers bailout and during 2010, the relation is opposite: the SovX market reacts more
rapidly to credit risk information and the iTraxx market adjusts to movements in the
sovereign market. Even in this case, estimation results should be interpreted with caution
because of the presence of parameter instability for both lambdas. Finally, results for
the relation between sovereign CDS spreads and banks' CDS spreads are illustrated from
Table (19) to Table (22). When cointegration holds, our estimates show the leading power
of the sovereign CDS especially during post-Lehman period. However, the absence of a
long-run relation between the two series does not allow us to perform the model for the
2010 period.
32During the pre-Lehman period, the VECM estimated with DOLS for iTraxx Senior Financials and
all results for iTraxx Crossover are troubling. Even if the estimated 1 coecients are signicant and with
the correct sign, 2 coecients have a higher weight, leading to an inappropriate meaning.
245 Conclusions
This paper has examined two types of analysis for the sovereign credit risk market. In the
rst, we consider the relation between CDS and bond spreads for sovereign entities using
short- and long-run exercises. Moreover, we also consider credit risk market behaviour. In
the second, we study the relation between CDS spreads for sovereign and corporate entities
by running the same short- and long-run analysis on both an aggregate and sector-wide
basis.
The relation between sovereign CDS and bond spreads oers three useful indications.
Cointegration results suggest that credit risk indicators do not move in the same way in the
long run when we the shift from the pre- to the post-Lehman subperiod. The three-month
EURIBOR-EUREPO spread helps to restore this relationship, especially for countries
with a negative basis. Second, when we shift to short-term causality, the results imply a
predictive power from one market to the other, with a two-way relationship. Third, the
CDS sovereign market becomes the leading forum for credit risk during 2010, especially for
higher spread countries, even if for the previous two subperiods both markets contribute
in price discovery.
Moreover, market behaviour results, especially for Ireland, Italy and Spain, suggest that
the CDS market may react to announcements about the Eurozone crisis. The same
evidence is conrmed by the event-study analysis only for the case of Ireland. Secondly,
market proxies seem to be signicant determinants for both CDS and bond spreads in
some cases, even if the impact and the meaning of the sign and the time lag is dicult
to interpret. Thirdly, when we put on the opposite direction, we nd signicant evidence
of the role of the sovereign CDS market on net and gross positions, as well as on the
number of contracts. It seems dicult to detect a possible relationship between prices and
volumes.
For the comparison between sovereign and corporate CDS spreads, short-term causality
imply a bivariate relation between the two markets when we consider CDS indices. How-
ever, when we turn to the analysis between the sovereign and the banking sector, the
bivariate relationship holds only for 2010 and for countries with high CDS spreads. The
banking sector increases its leading power over the sovereign sector during 2010. On the
other hand, long-run analysis suggests that the iTraxx leads the SovX during the pre-
Lehman, while the sovereign CDS index leads in terms of price discovery thereafter. The
leading property of sovereign CDS spreads is also conrmed through the relation with the
banking sector.
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Figure 1: PIIGS and Belgium. CDS spreads vs bond spreads. 2007 - 2010. Shaded area refers
to the post-Lehman period and 2010. Basis for PIIGS and safest countries. See Coudert and Gex
(2010).
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Figure 2: CDS spreads for bank and sovereign entities (PIIGS) and CDS indices. 2007 - 2010
period. Shaded area refers to the post-Lehman and 2010.
31Figure 3: Net positions for selected countries.
Timeline of signicant bad news. December 2009 - June 2010
* December 8: Fitch cuts rating on Greek debt to BBB plus with negative outlook - rst
time in ten years a leading rating agency has rated Greece sovereign paper below A grade
* January 12: Greece is condemned by the European Commission for falsifying data on its
public nances. Angela Merkel says that Greece's mounting decit could harm the euro,
which faces a very dicult phase in the coming years (comment posted on a government
website and later removed).
* January 28: Bungled attempt by Greece to sell government debt to China becomes public.
* March 25: Eurozone agrees on emergency plan for Greece, but immediately after divergent
interpretations of agreement surface between member states and unsettle markets.
* April 23: Greece asks for activation of Eurozone/IMF loan. EU says terms of aid may be
agreed in a matter of days, but Merkel says Greek government must satisfy very stringent
conditions.
* May 3: 110 billion euro Eurozone-IMF support package for Greece adopted. ECB relaxes
collateral policy for Greek sovereign debt.
* June 14: Moody's downgrades Greek sovereign debt to junk.
32Figure 4: Event-study analysis. Average reaction to bad news. Cumulative change in CDS
spreads.
Figure 5: Event-study analysis. Average reaction to bad news. Cumulative change in bond
spreads.
332. Results
2.1 Sovereign CDS vs Bond Spreads
Table 1: Long-run relationship between credit risk indicators. Estimated cointegrating vectors.
Pre-Lehman period. A, B and C stand for 1%, 5% and 10% signicance level only for the constant
and for the augmented cointegrating vector. The rst two raws relate to the Johansen Trace test
without and with constant. The third is dedicated to DOLS estimation.





















1 -0.188 1 -0.108
A -0.159
A
ITALY 1 -0.372 0 1 -0.230
A -0.240
A 0
1 -0.670 1 -0.702
A 0.010






1 -0.851 1 -0.993
A 0.060







1 -0.190 1 -0.248
A 0.014
NETHERLANDS 1 -0.146 0 1 -0.041 -0.029 0
1 0.021 -2.599
C 1 -0.131 0.045 -2.910
B
1 0.029 1 -0.052 0.024




AUSTRIA 1 -0.095 0 1 -0.101
A 0.003 0
1 -0.100 0.160 1 -0.090
A -0.005 0.216
1 -0.075 1 -0.047
A -0.019
BULGARIA 1 7.984 -5.423
A 0
1 -2.247 -0.766
















A 1 0.451 -0.101 -7.799
1 0.168 1 0.267 -0.034
34Table 2: Long-run relationship between credit risk indicators. Estimated cointegrating vectors.
Post-Lehman and 2010 periods. A, B and C stand for 1%, 5% and 10% signicance level only for
the constant and for the augmented cointegrating vector. The rst two raws relate to the Johansen
Trace test without and with constant. The third is dedicated to DOLS estimation.
POST-LEHMAN PERIOD
Country CDS BS constant CDS BS spread constant
IRELAND 1 -0.893 0 1 -0.800A -0.177C 0
1 -1.093 36.097 1 -0.509A -0.023 -59.446C
1 -0.854 1 -0.919A -0.304C
ITALY 1 -0.643A -0.089 0
1 -1.291 60.452A 1 -0.210 -0.219B -35.871B




FRANCE 1 1146.250A -73.682A 0
1 11.965A -0.794A -36.003A
1 0.004 -0.062A
NETHERLANDS 1 -0.380A -0.027 0
1 -0.582A -0.009 7.993A
1 -0.640A -0.023
DENMARK 1 -0.209A -0.169B 0
1 -0.198A -0.192B 1.053
1 -0.317A -0.063
AUSTRIA 1 -1.094A 0.093 0
1 -1.167A 0.079
BULGARIA 1 -7.164 0 1 -2.569A -2.906A 0
1 -2.032A -2.318A -75.513B





1 3.827A 0.304 -1211.205A
1 -0.668 -0.886A
FINLAND 1 0.251A -0.180A 0
1 -0.018 -0.066A
SWEDEN 1 0.030 -0.436A 0
1 1.093A 0.233A -39.494A
1 0.567 0.018
HUNGARY 1 -0.406A -1.151A 0
1 -0.562A -1.116A 85.152
1 -0.670A -1.034A
LATVIA 1 -30.431 1 -25.161A -4.093A 0
1 -11.566 -421.633A 1 19.284A 1.007 -1020.530A
1 -2.781 1 -3.288A -2.068A
2010 PERIOD
IRELAND 1 -0.770 0
1 -0.800
SPAIN 1 -1.070 0 1 -0.968A -0.558A 0
1 -0.968 -14.442C 1 -1.036A 2.791C -77.924A
1 -0.925 1 0.985A 2.230
AUSTRIA 1 -4.741A 6.490A 0
1 -3.079 95.568A 1 -3.674A 2.169 65.376
1 -0.874 1 -0.749 -0.976
CZECH REP. 1 -0.424 0 1 -0.312A -0.526C 0
1 -0.307 -14.322B 1 -1.167A 13.352A -256.476A
1 -0.244 1 -0.141 -1.940
POLAND 1 2.739A -34.584A 0
1 -0.235A -4.891A 103.540A
1 -0.474A -1.882
SWEDEN 1 -0.258 0 1 -0.673A -0.213 0
1 -0.623 -4.477 1 -0.423 -5.427A 138.069A




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































36Table 4: Contributions to price discovery. Gonzalo-Granger and Hasbrouck measures. CDS vs
bond spreads with traditional cointegrating vector. Pre-Lehman. A, B and C stand for 1%, 5%
and 10% signicance level. The rst two raws relate to the Johansen Trace test without and
with constant. The third is dedicated to the DOLS estimation. The fourth row relates to classic
cointegrating vector.
Ticker 1 2 Gonz-Grang HAS1 HAS2 MID
IRELAND na na na na na na
-0.069
A 0.017 0.200 0.147 0.118 0.133
-0.033
A 0.009 0.215 0.174 0.140 0.157
-0.009 0.007
B 0.462 0.695 0.651 0.673
ITALY -0.011
B 0.013
B 0.551 0.506 0.575 0.541
na na na na na na
-0.005 -0.001 0 0.016 0.004 0.010
-0.002 -0.002 1.000 0.571 0.246 0.409
SPAIN -0.013 0.025
A 0.655 0.918 0.933 0.926
na na na na na na
-0.022 0.023
A 0.519 0.955 0.982 0.969
na na na na na na
FRANCE -0.061
A 0.049
B 0.446 0.450 0.393 0.421
-0.064
A 0.079
A 0.551 0.667 0.615 0.641
-0.061
A 0.035
C 0.368 0.292 0.240 0.266
na na na na na na
NETHERLANDS -0.248
A -0.003 0 0.013 0.007 0.010
-0.262
A -0.004 0 0.020 0.013 0.016
-0.240
A -0.002 0 0.008 0.004 0.006
-0.121
A -0.002 0 0.050 0.038 0.044
DENMARK -0.074
A 0.001 0.015 0.015 0.031 0.023
-0.097
A 0.001 0.005 0.002 0.009 0.006
-0.070
A -0.002 0.021 0.028 0.049 0.039
-0.038
B -0.002 0 0.078 0.053 0.066
AUSTRIA -0.085
A 0.167
B 0.661 0.224 0.252 0.238
-0.083
A 0.178
A 0.680 0.255 0.285 0.270
-0.090
A 0.146
B 0.618 0.166 0.190 0.178
-0.002 0.013
B 0.887 0.816 0.834 0.825
SWEDEN -0.079
A -0.001 0 0.004 0.002 0.003
-0.085
A 0.010
B 0.108 0.267 0.289 0.278
-0.064
A 0.003 0.050 0.066 0.075 0.070
-0.033
B 0.004 0.119 0.314 0.332 0.323
37Table 5: Contributions to price discovery. Gonzalo-Granger and Hasbrouck measures. CDS vs
bond spreads with augmented cointegrating vector. Pre-Lehman. A, B and C stand for 1%, 5%
and 10% signicance level. The rst two raws relate to the Johansen Trace test without and with
constant. The third is dedicated to the DOLS estimation.
Ticker 1 2 Gonz-Grang HAS1 HAS2 MID
BELGIUM -0.006
A -0.001 0 0.075 0.043 0.059
0.007
A 0.003
C 0 0.237 0.184 0.211
-0.019
C 0.003 0.140 0.034 0.069 0.052
GREECE -0.012
A 0.002 0.148 0.019 0.064 0.042
na na na na na na
-0.003 -0.001 0 0.054 0.015 0.035
IRELAND -0.094
A -0.008 0 0.018 0.035 0.026
-0.107
A -0.005 0 0.005 0.015 0.010
-0.092
A -0.002 0 0 0.007 0.003
ITALY -0.021
A 0.001 0.052 0.002 0.015 0.009
na na na na na na
-0.006
C -0.003 0 0.190 0.137 0.163
SPAIN 0.003 0.018
A 1 0.994 0.993 0.994
0.004 0.016
A 1 0.983 0.981 0.982
-0.024 0.026
A 0.524 0.806 0.817 0.811
FRANCE -0.002
B 0.000 0 0 0.008 0.004
0.009 0.010 1 0.570 0.635 0.602
-0.065
A 0.030 0.316 0.209 0.163 0.186
NETHERLANDS -0.249
A -0.003 0 0.014 0.007 0.011
-0.262
A -0.005 0 0.024 0.016 0.020
-0.238
A -0.003 0 0.009 0.004 0.006
AUSTRIA -0.083
A 0.177
A 0.681 0.256 0.286 0.271
-0.091
A 0.173
B 0.655 0.214 0.243 0.228
-0.095
A 0.072 0.429 0.042 0.053 0.047
BULGARIA -0.003
B 0.000 0.002 0 0.003 0.001
na na na na na na
0.003 0.000 0 0.451 0.410 0.431
CZECH REP. 0.000 -0.015
A 1 1.000 0.998 0.999
na na na na na na
-0.001 0.009 0.861 0.807 0.830 0.818
FINLAND -0.329
A 0.111 0.252 0.128 0.103 0.116
-0.147
B 0.000 0 0 0.009 0.004
-0.163
B 0.047 0.222 0.101 0.064 0.082
SWEDEN -0.089
A 0.003 0.029 0.022 0.028 0.025
-0.094
A 0.006 0.064 0.105 0.118 0.112
-0.070
A 0.004 0.052 0.072 0.081 0.076Table 6: Contributions to price discovery. Gonzalo-Granger and Hasbrouck measures. CDS vs
bond spreads with traditional cointegrating vector. Post-Lehman. A, B and C stand for 1%,
5% and 10% signicance level. The rst two raws relate to the Johansen Trace test without and
with constant. The third is dedicated to the DOLS estimation. The fourth row relates to classic
cointegrating vector.
Ticker 1 2 Gonz-Grang HAS1 HAS2 MID
IRELAND 0.000 0.035A 0.988 0.914 1.000 0.957
0.012 0.035A 1 0.999 0.940 0.970
-0.001 0.033A 0.972 0.904 0.995 0.950
0.001 0.025A 1 0.931 1.000 0.965
ITALY na na na na na na
0.019 0.054A 1 0.987 0.856 0.921
-0.003 0.021 0.863 0.811 0.976 0.893
na na na na na na
PORTUGAL na na na na na na
-0.041A 0.031C 0.433 0.197 0.476 0.336
0.000 0.007 0.939 0.878 0.994 0.936
na na na na na na
BULGARIA -0.009 0.004A 0.329 0.808 0.957 0.883
na na na na na na
-0.006 0.002C 0.209 0.680 0.874 0.777
na na na na na na
CZECH REP. na na na na na na
-0.011A 0.004 0.289 0.096 0.279 0.187
0.003 0.012C 1 0.998 0.929 0.964
na na na na na na
LATVIA 0.003C 0.001A 0 0.839 0.747 0.793
0.005 0.004A 0 0.978 0.928 0.953
0.000 0.001 0.675 0.947 0.990 0.968
-0.001 0.000 0.423 0.844 0.926 0.885
39Table 7: Contributions to price discovery. Gonzalo-Granger and Hasbrouck measures. CDS vs
bond spreads with augmented cointegrating vector. Post-Lehman. A, B and C stand for 1%, 5%
and 10% signicance level. The rst two raws relate to the Johansen Trace test without and with
constant. The third is dedicated to the DOLS estimation.
Ticker 1 2 Gonz-Grang HAS1 HAS2 MID
IRELAND -0.002 0.003
C 0.607 0.893 0.861 0.877
-0.033
A 0.009 0.215 0.174 0.140 0.157
-0.009 0.007
B 0.462 0.695 0.651 0.673
ITALY -0.015 0.043
A 0.737 0.662 0.899 0.781
-0.029
A 0.006 0.167 0.026 0.193 0.109
-0.011 0.025
B 0.696 0.607 0.860 0.734
FRANCE 0.000 0.000 1 0.732 0.680 0.706
0.000 0.000 1 0.794 0.747 0.770
-0.154
A 0.056 0.267 0.045 0.080 0.063
NETHERLANDS -0.042
B 0.036
B 0.462 0.371 0.545 0.458
-0.038
C 0.067
A 0.637 0.655 0.813 0.734
-0.010 0.018
C 0.639 0.667 0.810 0.738
DENMARK -0.035
A 0.003 0.085 0.001 0.023 0.012
-0.124
A -0.002 0 0.014 0.007 0.010
-0.132
A -0.001 0 0.006 0.002 0.004
AUSTRIA -0.034
C 0.019
B 0.357 0.406 0.661 0.534
na na na na na na
-0.033
C 0.019
B 0.362 0.416 0.671 0.543
BULGARIA -0.049
A -0.003
B 0 0.256 0.105 0.181
-0.065
A -0.003
C 0 0.154 0.039 0.096
-0.031
A 0.000 0.008 0.004 0.083 0.044
POLAND na na na na na na
-0.012
A -0.003 0 0.054 0.022 0.038
-0.004 -0.001 0 0 0 0
FINLAND -0.041
A -0.035
B 0 0.349 0.277 0.313
na na na na na na
-0.039
B 0.020 0.339 0.137 0.214 0.176
SWEDEN -0.023
A -0.004 0 0.014 0.040 0.027
-0.004 -0.003
C 1 0.935 0.970 0.952
-0.002 -0.003 1 0.027 0.032 0.030
HUNGARY -0.077
A 0.017 0.178 0.049 0.211 0.130
-0.085
A 0.028
C 0.247 0.101 0.305 0.203
-0.009 0.002 0.153 0.038 0.173 0.106
LATVIA 0.005
B 0.002
A 0 0.751 0.652 0.701
-0.007
A -0.001
B 0 0.391 0.290 0.341
-0.001 0.001 0.404 0.833 0.915 0.874Table 8: Contributions to price discovery. Gonzalo-Granger and Hasbrouck measures. CDS vs bond
spreads with traditional cointegrating vector. 2010 period. A, B and C stand for 1%, 5% and 10%
signicance level. The rst two raws relate to the Johansen Trace test without and with constant. The
third is dedicated to the DOLS estimation. The fourth row relates to classic cointegrating vector.
Ticker 1 2 Gonz-Grang HAS1 HAS2 MID
IRELAND 0.069 0.222A 1 0.783 0.904 0.844
na na na na na na
0.059 0.197A 1 0.772 0.911 0.842
0.002 0.012 1 0.628 0.981 0.804
SPAIN 0.124B 0.161A 1 0.925 0.712 0.818
0.130B 0.195A 1 0.851 0.807 0.829
0.054 0.072A 1 0.912 0.727 0.820
0.091B 0.120A 1 0.918 0.721 0.819
AUSTRIA na na na na na na
0.006 0.057A 1 0.861 0.992 0.926
-0.050C 0.072A 0.485 0.240 0.704 0.472
na na na na na na
CZECH REP. -0.068B 0.1036B 0.603 0.270 0.718 0.494
-0.107A 0.107C 0.498 0.160 0.596 0.378
-0.020 0.018 0.480 0.160 0.546 0.353
0.001 0.004 1 1.000 0.842 0.921
SWEDEN -0.041A 0.059B 0.592 0.308 0.241 0.274
-0.038A 0.088A 0.699 0.558 0.489 0.523
-0.027A 0.055B 0.671 0.490 0.413 0.451
-0.019B 0.047B 0.705 0.582 0.499 0.541
Table 9: Contributions to price discovery. Gonzalo-Granger and Hasbrouck measures. CDS vs bond
spreads with augmented cointegrating vector. 2010 period. A, B and C stand for 1%, 5% and 10%
signicance level. The rst two raws relate to the Johansen Trace test without and with constant. The
third is dedicated to the DOLS estimation.
Ticker 1 2 Gonz-Grang HAS1 HAS2 MID
SPAIN 0.141B 0.195A 1 0.891 0.764 0.827
0.158B 0.223A 1 0.877 0.782 0.830
0.014 0.016C 1 0.982 0.570 0.776
AUSTRIA 0.009 0.036A 1 0.963 0.941 0.952
0.007 0.049A 1 0.905 0.980 0.942
-0.007 0.005 0.404 0.172 0.589 0.381
CZECH REP. -0.102A 0.100C 0.495 0.163 0.591 0.377
-0.010 0.067A 0.870 0.650 0.970 0.810
-0.020 -0.014 0 0.202 0.004 0.103
POLAND -0.013 -0.014C 1 0.916 0.252 0.584
-0.174A -0.076 0 0.171 0.105 0.138
0.000 -0.002 1 0.613 0.992 0.802
SWEDEN -0.040A 0.089A 0.689 0 0 0.000
-0.035A 0.006 0.152 0.006 0.001 0.004
-0.001 0.026 0.949 1 0.986 0.9862.2 Market Reactions and Volumes
Table 10: Average reaction after bad news. CDS and bond spreads. */**/*** means signicant levels at
10%/5%/1%.
Countries / Days after 1 2 3 4 5
CDS spreads
Belgium 1.128 3.874* 3.411 3.552 1.196
Greece 40.765* 71.524* 71.004 63.189 28.625
Ireland 12.194* 21.874** 20.751* 16.129 7.129**
Italy 4.325 9.704 12.999 12.221 4.201
Portugal 16.391 36.647 33.671 30.287 6.421
Spain 9.801 16.444 18.599 12.401 4.095
France 0.381 1.016 0.822 0.850 0.411
Netherlands -0.427 -1.119 -1.710** -0.967* -1.519*
Austria -0.181 -0.981 -0.579 -0.102 -0.374
Denmark -0.486 -0.737 -1.683* -0.751 -1.689*
Sweden -0.275 -1.576 -2.602* -1.984 -1.756
Finland -1.106* -1.816 -2.149 -2.176 -2.362*
Bond spreads
Belgium 1.486 7.514 7.986 6.071 0.529
Greece 39.286* 57.186 77.643 83.500 17.486
Ireland 12.086** 21.429* 24.843 22.371 0.614
Italy 1.786 5.343 8.229 6.800 -0.757
Portugal 14.343* 32.314* 39.143* 37.443* 8.343
Spain 4.429 9.943 12.057 8.114 -2.414
France 0.471 1.043 0.657 -0.243 -2.314
Netherlands 0.400 0.286 2.200 1.071 -0.414
Austria 0.600 1.986 1.429 1.286 -0.129
Denmark -0.029 1.514 0.014 -0.514 -1.086
Sweden 1.157 1.987*** 0.910 -0.263 1.079
Finland 0.443 0.671 0.929 0.057 -1.629
Table 11: Average reaction after bad news. CDS and bond spreads dierences. */**/*** means signicant
levels at 10%/5%/1%.
CDS spreads - Bond spreads
Countries / Days after 1 2 3 4 5
Belgium -0.358 -3.640 -4.575 -2.519 0.668
Greece 1.479 14.338 -6.639 -20.311 11.139
Ireland 0.108 0.446 -4.091 -6.243 6.515
Italy 2.539 4.361 4.770 5.421 4.959
Portugal 2.049 4.333 -5.471 -7.156 -1.922
Spain 5.372 6.501 6.541 4.287 6.509
France -0.090 -0.027 0.165 1.093 2.725**
Netherlands -0.827 -1.404 -3.910 -2.039 -1.104
Austria -0.781 -2.967 -2.007 -1.388 -0.246
Denmark -0.457 -2.251 -1.697 -0.237 -0.603
Sweden -1.432 -3.564** -3.512 -1.721 -2.835















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































442.3 Sovereign CDS Spreads vs Corporate CDS Spreads
Table 14: Long-run relationship between SovX and dierent iTraxx indices. Estimated cointegrat-
ing vectors. All periods. A, B and C stand for 1%, 5% and 10% signicance level.
PRE-LEHMAN PERIOD
Index SovX iTraxx constant SovX iTraxx spread constant
iTraxx Europe 1 -0.213A 0 1 -0.208A -0.01 0
1 -0.214A -0.01 0.23
1 -0.206A na 1 -0.180A -0.033A na
iTraxx Sen. Fin. 1 -0.257A 0 1 -0.499A 0.287A 0
1 -0.188A -3.832A 1 -0.222A 0.04 -3.875A
1 -0.181A na 1 -0.189A 0.01 na
iTraxx cross 1 -0.033A 0 1 -0.024A -0.100A 0
1 -0.052A 6.819A 1 -0.063A 0.04 9.130A
1 -0.049A na 1 -0.043A -0.032A na
POST-LEHMAN PERIOD
iTraxx Europe 1 -1.002A 0.650A 0
1 -2.049A 1.309A 90.195A
1 -1.005A 0.372B na
iTraxx Sen. Fin. 1 -0.767A 0.09 0
1 -0.730A -0.04 na
iTraxx cross 1 -0.158A 0.496A 0
1 -0.178A 0.24 na
2010 PERIOD
iTraxx Europe 1 -1.624A 1.917A 0
1 -1.736A 4.201A -47.762A
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































46Table 16: Granger causality test. Sovereign CDS and banks' CDS spreads. F-statistic values.
*/**/*** denote respectively 1%, 5% and 10% of signicance levels. VAR(5) methodology.
POST-LEHMAN 2010
Countries Banks' CDS Sov. CDS Banks' CDS Sov. CDS
do not cause do not cause do not cause do not cause
Sov. CDS Banks' CDS Sov. CDS Banks' CDS
BELGIUM 1.141 0.773 2.403** 1.923*
GREECE 1.885* 2.176* 7.264*** 2.904**
IRELAND 0.092 4.919*** 0.998 8.581***
ITALY 1.790 1.809 3.400*** 2.800**
PORTUGAL 1.372 1.167 2.708** 11.353***
SPAIN 1.004 3.159*** 1.830 10.635***
FRANCE 2.525** 1.289 1.412 5.185***
NETHER. 2.582** 0.808 0.191* 2.787**
DENMARK 1.076 1.668 3.424*** 5.885***
AUSTRIA 1.589 7.395*** 0.590 7.378***
SWEDEN 0.536 5.434*** 1.857 3.670***
Table 17: Contributions to price discovery. Gonzalo-Granger and Hasbrouck measures. Dierent
CDS indices, bivariate cointegrating vector. A, B and C stand for 1%, 5% and 10% signicance
level. The rst two raws relate to the Johansen Trace test without and with constant. The third
is dedicated to the DOLS estimation.
Ticker 1 2 Gonz-Grang HAS1 HAS2 MID
PRE-LEHMAN
iTraxx general -0.054A 0.093B 0.631 0.446 0.519 0.483
na na na na na na
-0.053B 0.094B 0.638 0.462 0.534 0.498
iTraxx nancial -0.042A 0.043C 0.506 0.222 0.278 0.250
-0.100A 0.056 0.362 0.081 0.122 0.102
-0.023B 0.030 0.568 0.317 0.377 0.347
iTraxx crossover -0.061A 0.046 0.431 0.011 0.035 0.023
-0.087A 0.180 0.674 0.075 0.128 0.101
-0.021A -0.010 0 0.005 0 0.005
47Table 18: Contributions to price discovery. Gonzalo-Granger and Hasbrouck measures. Dierent CDS indices,
cointegrating vector with two indices and the spread 3-month Euribor-Eurepo. A, B and C stand for 1%, 5% and
10% signicance level. The rst two raws relate to the Johansen Trace test without and with constant. The third
is dedicated to the DOLS estimation.
Ticker 1 2 Gonz-Grang HAS1 HAS2 MID
PRE-LEHMAN
iTraxx general -0.092A 0.064C 0.411 0.130 0.177 0.154
-0.090A 0.064C 0.417 0.136 0.183 0.160
-0.0890A 0.068B 0.434 0.153 0.203 0.178
iTraxx nancial -0.016C 0.004 0.215 0.022 0.041 0.031
-0.096A 0.022 0.185 0.015 0.032 0.023
-0.024B 0.027 0.534 0.268 0.320 0.294
iTraxx crossover -0.065A 0.062 0.488 0.018 0.044 0.031
-0.066A 0.147 0.690 0.088 0.139 0.113
-0.024A -0.031 1 0.035 0.013 0.024
POST-LEHMAN
iTraxx general 0.009 0.034B 1 0.996 0.801 0.898
0.017A 0.031A 1 0.812 0.334 0.573
-0.002 0.016 0.901 0.611 0.980 0.795
iTraxx nancial 0.003 0.031B 1 0.882 0.979 0.930
-0.003 0.029B 0.917 0.651 0.983 0.817
iTraxx crossover -0.002 0.169A 0.990 0.741 0.996 0.869
na na na na na na
-0.004 0.034 0.904 0.348 0.795 0.572
2010-PERIOD
iTraxx general 0.044 0.146A 1 0.454 0.984 0.719
0.010 0.103B 1 0.370 0.999 0.684
0.011 0.016 1 0.698 0.879 0.789
Table 19: Contributions to price discovery. Gonzalo-Granger and Hasbrouck measures. Sovereign CDS vs banks'
CDS spreads with traditional cointegrating vector. Post-Lehman. A, B and C stand for 1%, 5% and 10% signicance
level. The rst two raws relate to the Johansen Trace test without and with constant. The third is dedicated to the
DOLS estimation. The fourth row relates to classic cointegrating vector.
Ticker 1 2 Gonz-Grang HAS1 HAS2 MID
GREECE 0.006 0.070A 1 0.983 0.981 0.982
0.007 0.070A 1 0.983 0.981 0.982
0.005 0.037A 1 0.966 0.962 0.964
IRELAND 0.010 0.059A 1 0.972 0.937 0.954
-0.006 0.071A 0.916 0.942 0.981 0.961
0.001 0.024B 1 1.000 0.994 0.997
ITALY
-0.002A -0.001 0 0.082 0.045 0.063
0.005 0.019A 1 0.949 0.926 0.937
PORTUGAL
-0.005A -0.004B 0 0.285 0.011 0.148
0.000 0.008 1 0.826 0.998 0.912
AUSTRIA
-0.016B 0.013 0.447 0.119 0.453 0.286
0.001 0.057A 1 0.871 0.993 0.932Table 20: Contributions to price discovery. Gonzalo-Granger and Hasbrouck measures. Sovereign CDS vs
banks' CDS spreads with augmented cointegrating vector. Post-Lehman. A, B and C stand for 1%, 5%
and 10% signicance level. The rst two raws relate to the Johansen Trace test without and with constant.
The third is dedicated to the DOLS estimation. The fourth row relates to classic cointegrating vector.
Ticker 1 2 Gonz-Grang HAS1 HAS2 MID
IRELAND 0.011 0.048A 1 0.935 0.880 0.908
0.002 0.055A 1 0.996 0.998 0.997
0.001 0.016 1 1.000 0.987 0.993
ITALY 0.019B 0.020B 1 0.700 0.215 0.457
-0.007A -0.003 0 0.095 0.040 0.067
-0.002 0.011 0.850 0.607 0.975 0.791
PORTUGAL
0.019A 0.013C 0 0.220 0 0.220
-0.006 0.026 0.826 0.565 0.950 0.757
FRANCE na
0.015A 0.018C 1 0.310 0.014 0.162
0.002 0.009 1 0.999 0.807 0.903
NETHERLANDS 0.012 0.045A 1 0.920 0.613 0.767
-0.003 0.044B 0.942 0.743 0.982 0.863
DENMARK -0.021B 0.060A 0.740 0.460 0.742 0.601
-0.021A 0.061A 0.744 0.469 0.750 0.609
-0.007 0.051A 0.873 0.733 0.930 0.831
AUSTRIA -0.012 0.055B 0.827 0.617 0.924 0.770
-0.023B 0.035C 0.605 0.278 0.278 0.278
-0.007 0.058B 0.894 0.723 0.971 0.847
SWEDEN -0.001 0.002 0.640 0.590 0.835 0.713
-0.011 0.020B 0.643 0.589 0.842 0.716
-0.006 0.023B 0.803 0.782 0.959 0.871
Table 21: Contributions to price discovery. Gonzalo-Granger and Hasbrouck measures. Sovereign CDS vs
banks' CDS spreads with traditional cointegrating vector. 2010. A, B and C stand for 1%, 5% and 10%
signicance level. The rst two raws relate to the Johansen Trace test without and with constant. The
third is dedicated to the DOLS estimation. The fourth row relates to classic cointegrating vector.
Ticker 1 2 Gonz-Grang HAS1 HAS2 MID
GREECE
0.007 0.181A 1.000 0.795 1.000 0.897
-0.030 0.007 0.182 0.065 0.446 0.255
Table 22: Contributions to price discovery. Gonzalo-Granger and Hasbrouck measures. Sovereign CDS vs
banks' CDS spreads with augmented cointegrating vector. 2010. A, B and C stand for 1%, 5% and 10%
signicance level. The rst two raws relate to Johansen Trace test without and with constant. The third
is dedicated to DOLS estimation. The fourth row relates to classic cointegrating vector.
Ticker 1 2 Gonz-Grang HAS1 HAS2 MID
GREECE
-0.049 0.198A 0.801 0.651 0.984 0.818
-0.011 -0.003 0 0.155 0.003 0.079
ITALY -0.134 0.056 0.295 0.078 0.853 0.466
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